Quartermasters can also fight the devils

Chapter 768: Advancement in the Pacific Battlefield

While the Japanese Expeditionary Force in China launched the Battle of Xiangxi on the Chinese battlefield, the American army, which had been advancing with great momentum in the Pacific battlefield, also launched a landing operation on Japan's native Okinawa Island. The Japanese headquarters was also determined to concentrate its remaining naval and air forces, hoping to destroy the main fleet of the American Pacific Fleet in the waters near Okinawa Island. At the same time, the Japanese headquarters ordered the army to hold Okinawa Island to buy time and preparation to strengthen the defense of Japan's mainland.

After the American army successfully occupied the Philippines in the Pacific Ocean, the position of Okinawa Island in Japan's homeland defense became more prominent. For the Japanese government, once Okinawa Island was lost, the sea and air control over Japan, Korea and the coastal areas of China would be completely lost, and the sea transportation lines to Southeast Asia on which the Japanese army relied for survival would also be completely cut off by the American army.

Therefore, the Japanese military headquarters judged that the American army would definitely land on Okinawa Island before attacking the Japanese mainland. Therefore, the Japanese military headquarters also attached great importance to the defense of Okinawa Island. Since July 1944, when the Mariana Islands occupied by the American army were occupied by the Japanese army, the Japanese military headquarters began to focus on strengthening the Japanese military's defensive forces and fortifications on Okinawa Island.

By January 1945, in order to successfully defend the Ryukyu Islands, the Japanese Imperial Headquarters had transported all the troops of the 32nd Army to the Ryukyu Islands, and ordered the commander of the 32nd Army, Lieutenant General Ushijima Mitsuru, to command four divisions and five brigades, with Okinawa Island as the defense focus, in preparation for a decisive battle with the United States' army.

The original combat plan of Lieutenant General Mitsuru Ushijima, commander of the 32nd Japanese Army, was to use the two airports in the central part of Okinawa Island as the core defense zone, first use kamikaze operations at sea and in the air to weaken the offensive forces of the American Army, and then concentrate the troops of the 32nd Japanese Army to annihilate the landing American Army on the beach.

However, after the American army attacked the Philippines, the Japanese Imperial Headquarters transferred the most combat-effective 9th Division of the Japanese 32nd Army's garrison on Okinawa Island to Taiwan to guard against the American army's attack on Taiwan. This caused great dissatisfaction among the commander of the Japanese 32nd Army, Lieutenant General Ushijima Mitsuru, with the order of the Japanese Imperial Headquarters.

Later, Lieutenant General Ushijima Mitsuru, commander of the 32nd Japanese Army, abandoned the plan to annihilate the United States' offensive forces on the beach on the grounds that the 32nd Japanese Army was short of manpower. He withdrew the 32nd Japanese Army's defense line from the central area of ​​Okinawa Island, where relatively complete fortifications were built, to the southern area of ​​Okinawa Island, preparing to implement a protracted defense relying on the fortified areas.

The reason why Lieutenant General Mitsuru Ushijima, commander of the 32nd Army of the Japanese Army, adopted such a combat plan was actually to lure the offensive forces of the United States into the deep areas where they could not get naval and air fire support, and then destroy the offensive forces of the United States by relying on the preset positions built by the 32nd Army of the Japanese Army.

Therefore, according to the combat plan of Lieutenant General Ushijima Mitsuru, commander of the 32nd Army of the Japanese Army, the 32nd Army of the Japanese Army deployed 80% of its troops in the southern area centered on Shuri, while in the northern and coastal areas of Okinawa Island, Lieutenant General Ushijima Mitsuru, commander of the 32nd Army of the Japanese Army, only deployed a small number of symbolic defense forces.

Before the United States' army launched the landing operation, the Japanese 32nd Army had two army divisions and one brigade on Okinawa Island, plus some naval security forces and marines, with a total strength of 100,000.

In order to ensure the success of the defensive operations on Okinawa Island, the Japanese military headquarters formulated an air force decisive battle plan code-named "Operation Ten-go" in March 1945.

In order to ensure the success of the "Operation Ten-go", the Japanese military headquarters concentrated a total of 2,990 combat aircraft from the army and navy, including 1,230 kamikaze suicide aircraft, and deployed them in Taiwan, China, the Ryukyu Islands, Kyushu and other regions of Japan, preparing to launch a fierce suicide assault on the United States' fleet and transport ships when the United States' offensive forces landed on Okinawa Island, and cooperate with the Japanese 32nd Army on Okinawa Island to crush the landing operation of the United States' offensive forces.

At the same time, the Japanese Navy also deployed hundreds of suicide motorboats and manned torpedoes for kamikaze special attack operations on Okinawa Island and its surrounding islands, preparing to carry out surface and underwater special attack operations against the naval ships of the United States. The remaining warships of the Japanese Navy Combined Fleet will also be dispatched at the appropriate time to make the final desperate attack.

As early as October 1944, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff issued an order to Admiral Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Theater, to capture Okinawa Island. Admiral Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Theater, followed this order and immediately began to organize relevant personnel to plan a combat plan to capture Okinawa Island.

On January 3, 1945, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the Okinawa operation plan formulated by Admiral Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Theater. On February 9, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the specific Okinawa landing operation plan and finally set the landing date of the United States offensive force on Okinawa as April 1, 1945.

Admiral Nimitz, commander-in-chief of the United States Pacific Theater, believed that since Okinawa Island was relatively close to the Japanese mainland, the United States army would inevitably encounter an all-out counterattack from the Japanese Air Force during the offensive operations, especially the desperate impact of Japanese suicide planes.

Although these suicide planes of the Japanese army were not enough to change the final outcome of the battle, it is undeniable that such suicide attacks by the Japanese army would pose a huge threat to the offensive forces of the United States. Therefore, in the combat plan of Admiral Nimitz, commander-in-chief of the Pacific Theater of the United States, before the offensive forces of the United States carried out the landing operation on Okinawa Island, the American army must first send air forces to carry out large-scale bombing of Japanese air bases in Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, and Taiwan, China, so as to weaken the strength of the Japanese air force as much as possible.

At the same time, one week before the United States' offensive force landed on Okinawa Island, the 77th Division of the United States Army needed to land on the Kerama Islands to establish a forward base for the United States' offensive force so that during the Battle of Okinawa Island, the United States' offensive force could carry out logistical supplies and repair damage nearby.